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CREDITORS' REMEDIES-DUE PROCESS
CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT IN
CALIFORNIA AFTER ISBELL v.
COUNTY OF SONOMA
The recent California Supreme Court opinion in Isbell v.
County of Sonoma represents the latest development in a continu-
ing tug-of-war between debtors' due process rights and creditors'
security interests. By ruling that California's cognovit procedure
fails to meet due process standards, the California Supreme Court
has invited the United States Supreme Court finally to draw the
line on extensions of the Sniadach-Fuentes debtor-protection ra-
tionale. The Comment analyzes the Isbell opinion in view of con-
trary United States Supreme Court precedent, examines its
impact, and proposes guidelines for a new cognovit procedure to
meet Isbell standards.
The confession of judgment, or cognovit,' is traditionally used
by creditors to protect a security interest. The confession of judg-
ment typically appears in a promissory note that contains a "con-
fession" clause and an authorization for any attorney to obtain a
judgment against the debtor. The clause eliminates the need for
judicial proceedings. 2 The cognovit note typically waives debtor
protections. By confessing judgment, a debtor relinquishes bona
fide defenses to non-payment, the right to appeal from entry of
judgment, the right to receive notice of the judgment, and the op-
portunity to be heard on the merits of the claim.3 Because of
1. For the purposes of this Comment, the two terms are used interchange-
ably.
2. Blackstone described the cognovit procedure as "very usual, in order to
strengthen a bond-creditor's security, for the debtor to execute a warrant of attor-
ney to any one, empowering him to confess a judgment... in an action of debt to
be brought by the creditor for the specific sum due." 3 W. BLACKSTONE, CoMMiEN-
TARiES *397.
3. Comment, Confessions of Judgment, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 524, 529 (1954).
Confession of judgment statutes may further deprive a debtor of protection. Sev-
eral states permit entry of judgment prior to default, thereby creating a lien on the
debtor's real property. Upon default, the creditor may begin immediate execution
proceedings. E.g., CAT_ Cirv. PRoc. CODE § 1132(a) (West Supp. 1978); DEL. CODE
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these waivers, the confession of judgment has raised serious con-
stitutional issues of due process.4
The California Supreme Court, in Isbell v. County of Sonoma,5
recently invalidated California's confession of judgment statute
on fourteenth amendment due process grounds notwithstanding
contrary United States Supreme Court precedent.6 This Com-
ment analyzes the California Supreme Court's holding in Isbell
and examines the need for a new confession of judgment proce-
dure in California. Guidelines are proposed for legislation in Cali-
fornia that will meet the due process safeguards required by the
California Supreme Court.
BACKGROUND
Entry of judgment based on a debtor's confession creates a lien
against the debtor's real property and thereby deprives the debtor
of a significant property interest.7 Due process requires that no-
tit. 10, § 2306 (1975); MicH. COMP. LAWs ANN. § 600.2906 (West 1968); N.Y. Crv. PRAC.
LAw § 3218(a) (McKinney 1978); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. AN. §§ 2951(c), 2952(e), 2958
(Purdon 1975). The debtor is thereby placed at a severe disadvantage should he
try to undo his default. The burden of proof as a defaulting debtor is more difficult
than as a defendant in an original action by the creditor. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380
U.S. 545, 551 (1965); Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091, 1094 (E.D. Pa. 1970). The
pressure of a judgment lien, the realization of a fait accompli, and the burden of
asserting a defense may cause the judgment debtor to give up rather than to as-
sert his rights. Comment, Cognovit Revisited: Due Process and Confession of
Judgment, 24 HASTINGs L.J. 1045, 1066 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Cognovit
Revisited].
4. As early as 1824 the procedure had been described as "the loosest way of
binding a man's property that ever was devised." Alderman v. Diament, 7 N.J.L.
197, 198 (1824). The cognovit enjoyed wide use as a commercial security device in
nineteenth century England, but it has since been abolished for creditor abuse.
Baron, Confession of Judgment: The Futures Market in Due Process Rights in
Pennsylvania, 4 CLEARmGHOUSE REV. 117, 118 (1970).
5. 21 Cal. 3d 61, 577 P.2d 188, 145 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1978).
6. In Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191 (1972), D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405
U.S. 174 (1972) and Osmond v. Spence, 405 U.S. 971 (1972), the United States
Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of the Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Dela-
ware confession of judgment statutes, respectively, in the face of fourteenth
amendment due process challenges. For a discussion of the apparent inconsis-
tency of the California Supreme Court's holding in Isbell in light of this United
States Supreme Court precedent, see text accompanying notes 40-42 infra.
7. See North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 606 (1975)
(even temporary deprivation of use and possession of funds in a bank account
pursuant to a writ of garnishment is within the purview of the due process
clause); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 84-86 (1972) (temporary, informal depriva-
tion of property pursuant to a writ of replevin is a "deprivation" in the terms of
the fourteenth amendment); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 341-42
(1969) (prejudgment garnishment that ties up a debtor's wages is an obvious "tak-
ing"); Connolly Dev., Inc. v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 803, 813-14, 553 P.2d 637, 642-
43, 132 Cal. Rptr. 477, 482-83 (1976) (filing of a stop notice or of a mechanic's lien
deprives a landowner of a significant property interest); Barry Properties, Inc. v.
Fick Bros. Roofing Co., 277 Md. 15, 24, 353 A.2d 222, 228 (1976) (mechanic's lien de-
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tice and opportunity for a hearing precede a judgment depriving a
person of a significant property interest.8 By confessing judg-
ment, however, the debtor waives his rights to notice and hear-
ing.9 Although the debtor may intentionally waive these rights,
courts indulge every presumption against waiver of notice and
hearing.10 To validly waive fundamental rights, the debtor must
act knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily."1 Therefore, in the
context of cognovit notes, g court must determine whether to ac-
cept the debtor's mere signature as sufficient evidence of his
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver or to require further
evidence of the effectiveness of the waiver. This determination is
prives owner of a significant property interest). Contra, Mitchell v. W.T. Grant
Co., 416 U.S. 600, 607-09 (1974) (repossession of encumbered property pursuant to
writ of sequestration does not constitute a taking within the meaning of the four-
teenth amendment so as to require notice and opportunity for hearing); Spielman-
Fond, Inc. v. Hanson's, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 997, 999 (D. Ariz. 1973) (filing of mechan-
ic's lien and materialman's lien does not amount to a taking of a significant prop-
erty interest).
The deprivation need not reach the magnitude of physical seizure to fall within
the protection of the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. Goss v. Lopez,
419 U.S. 565 (1975) (10-day suspension from school).
8. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 (1975); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371,
378-79 (1971); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969).
9. "[I]t is settled ... that parties to a contract may agree in advance to sub-
mit to the jurisdiction of a given court, to permit notice to be served by the oppos-
ing party, or even to waive notice altogether." National Equip. Rental v. Szukhent,
375 U.S. 311, 315-16 (1964) (Michigan resident defendant in an action filed on a con-
tract in New York held to have received service of process within the meaning of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by having designated resident of New York
as agent authorized to receive process). Accord, Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S.
371, 378-79 (1971) (due process of law prohibits denying indigents access to courts
because of their inability to pay court fees and costs when they seek in good faith
judicial dissolution of their marriages). Courts uniformly cite Szukhent for the
proposition that rights to notice and hearing can be waived. However, these rights
are independent of each other, and the facts in Szukhent did not actually involve
waiver of either notice or hearing. The case has precedential value only when con-
sidered with its dictum, dissenting opinions, and continued use with approval by
the Supreme Court. Regardless, Szukhent does not stand for the proposition that
the opportunity to be heard can be waived altogether. Cognovit Revisited, supra
note 3, at 1049 n.27.
10. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public
Utils. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 307 (1937); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393
(1937).
11. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966); Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S.
708, 723-24 (1948); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). Although the above
cases discuss the validity of the waiver in criminal contexts, the standards have
been uniformly applied to all waivers, whether civil or criminal in nature. See, e.g.,
Isbell v. County of Sonoma, 21 Cal. 3d 61, 577 P.2d 188, 145 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1978).
basic to any examination of the confession of judgment proce-
dure.
The United States Supreme Court first encountered a due proc-
ess challenge to the confession of judgment procedure in 1972.12
In D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co.,13 a large corporate debtor14 ex-
ecuted contracts containing cognovit clauses. The challenged
Ohio statute15 required that notice be given a debtor immediately
upon entry of judgment and allowed a debtor to vacate the judg-
ment upon showing a meritorious defense. The Court was satis-
fied that the Ohio procedure met due process requirements and
held that a confession of judgment is not per se unconstitu-
tional.16 However, the Court stated that under other circum-
stances, such as adhesion contracts, disparity in bargaining
power, or lack of consideration for the cognovit provision, other
legal consequences could follow.17 After Overmyer, a cognovit
statute that allows the debtor to make at least a post-entry attack
12. Previously, in Grover & Baker Mach. Co. v. Radcliffe, 137 U.S. 287 (1890),
and in National Exch. Bank v. Wiley, 195 U.S. 257 (1904), the Court examined the
procedure only in the context of the full faith and credit doctrine.
13. 405 U.S. 174 (1972).
14. That the plaintiff was an experienced commercial debtor who enjoyed the
benefit of legal counsel when the cognovits were signed may have been determina-
tive in the case.
15. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2323.13 (Page 1954) (as amended), reprinted in 405
U.S. at 175 n.1 (current version at Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2323.13 (Page Supp.
1978)).
16. 405 U.S. at 187.
17. Id. at 188. Immediately after rendering its opinion in Overmyer, the Court
had opportunities to determine the circumstances under which the cognovit proce-
dure would violate due process safeguards. In Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191
(1972), a class of consumers challenged the Pennsylvania cognovit procedure as
unconstitutional per se because it lacked sufficient due process safeguards. The
plaintiffs in Swarb advanced two arguments. First, they argued that waiver of due
process rights was rarely knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and second, that the
procedure required to reopen judgment discriminated against low-income consum-
ers because it was costly and burdensome. Id. at 196. Nevertheless, the Court re-
fused to hold the Pennsylvania confession of judgment statute unconstitutional
per se and reaffirmed Overmyer. Id. at 201-02.
The Court, in light of the Overmyer and Swarb opinions, vacated and remanded
the holding of the Delaware federal district court in Osmond v. Spence, 327 F.
Supp. 1349 (D. Del. 1971), vacated and remanded, 405 U.S. 971 (1972). The Dela-
ware district court had determined in Osmond that Delaware's confession of judg-
ment procedure lacked the judicial means by which a court could determine
whether a debtor had knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his rights to
notice and hearing. Upon remand, the district court adhered to its original posi-
tion. The court distinguished the Overmyer and Swarb decisions because the
United States Supreme Court had not considered the necessary timing of a hear-
ing on the effectiveness of the waiver. 359 F. Supp. 124, 127 (D. Del. 1972). The
plaintiffs in both Overmyer and Swarb had made broad, sweeping challenges of
unconstitutionality per se to the respective Ohio and Pennsylvania procedures.
Therefore, the Overmyer Court merely ruled that the confession of judgment pro-
cedure in general was not unconstitutional. It never reached the specific issue
raised in Osmond.
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on the judgment's validity contains due process safeguards suffi-
cient to satisfy the United States Supreme Court.18
Lower federal courts have distinguished Overmyer when faced
with challenges to other cognovit statutes and have held that due
process requires a pre-judgment hearing on the effectiveness of
the waiver.19 Similarly, the California Supreme Court in Isbell in-
validated its statutory confession of judgment procedure for fail-
ure to afford opportunity for prejudgment determination of the
effectiveness of the waiver. This Comment will demonstrate that
the California Supreme Court's decision in Isbell should compel
the United States Supreme Court finally to resolve the future of
the confession of judgment as a summary creditors' remedy.20
18. Cognovit Revisited, supra note 3, at 1063.
19. For example, the Illinois federal district court, in Scott v. Danaher, 343 F.
Supp. 1272 (N.D. Ill. 1972), required a waiver hearing before a writ of garnishment
based on a confession of judgment could issue. Significantly, neither the writ of
garnishment nor the confession of judgment statutes provided for notice or for an
opportunity for hearing. Illinois Garnishment Act, Ila. REV. STAT. ch. 62, § 33
(1969); Civil Practice Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 50(3) (Smith-Hurd 1968).
A federal district court in Virgin I. Nat'l Bank v. Tropical Ventures, Inc., 358 F.
Supp. 1203 (D. St. Croix 1973), held that no "rule of thumb" could be appropriate
in determining the effectiveness of a debtor's waiver even though the debtors in
Virgin Islands were large corporations, were dealing in large sums of money, and
were represented by relatively sophisticated businessmen. The court ruled that a
constitutionally valid confession of judgment procedure requires an opportunity
for a judicial examination of the effectiveness of the waiver. Id. at 1206-07.
Recent decisions indicate a split between the two lines of reasoning. The
Overmyer-Swarb opinions required no pre-entry hearing regarding the validity of
the waiver. The federal district courts in Scott and in Virgin Islands held that
such a hearing must precede entry of judgment. Compare Union Barge Line Corp.
v. Marble Cliff Quarries Co., 374 F. Supp. 834 (S.D. W. Va. 1974) (prejudgment gar-
nishment statute unconstitutional for failure to require prior evaluation of the
claim's probable validity), and First Mercantile Co. v. Bittner, 337 A.2d 321 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1975) (confession of judgment statute unconstitutional for failure to
provide notice and hearing prior to entry of judgment), with Tunheim v. Bowman,
366 F. Supp. 1392 (D. Nev. 1973) (cognovit statute requiring neither notice or hear-
ing prior to judgment nor prompt notice after judgment not per se unconstitu-
tional), Billingsley v. Lincoln Nat'l Bank, 271 Md. 683, 320 A.2d 34 (1974) (when a
hearing is available to plaintiffs upon motion to vacate, statute not unconstitu-
tional), Irmco Hotels Corp. v. Solomon, 27 Ill. App. 3d 225, 326 N.E.2d 542 (1975)
(cognovit statute permitting final entry of judgment without notice and hearing
not unconstitutional per se), and International Equity Corp. v. Pepper & Tanner,
Inc., 222 Pa. Super. Ct. 118, 293 A.2d 108 (1972) (confession of judgment clause in
contract between corporations with broad business experience not involuntary).
20. Sonoma County, California, has filed a petition for certiorari seeking re-
view on the question whether the California statute is violative of the fourteenth
amendment on its face or only as applied to the facts in Isbell. 47 U.S.L.W. 3227
(U.S. Oct. 3, 1978). However, the United States Supreme Court denied review, 47
U.S.L.W. 3359 (U.S. Nov. 28, 1978), after having indicated its unwillingness to in-
Before analyzing the need for Supreme Court review, however,
the California confession of judgment procedure and the Isbell
case must be discussed.
CALIFORNIA CONFESSIONS OF JUDGMENT AND THE ISBELL ANALYSIS
California's confession of judgment statute allows a debtor or
guarantor to execute a cognovit note by signing a sworn state-
ment consenting to judgment before or after a creditor files an
action on the debt.21 The debtor's statement must set forth con-
cisely the facts underlying the debt and must declare that the re-
quested amount is justly due. The creditor files this statement
with the clerk in any court having jurisdiction over that amount.22
California restricts the use of cognovits "where the risk of inequi-
table harshness is high."23 To further this policy, California re-
cently amended its cognovit statute to prevent improper use of
the procedure by creditors in consumer transactions. 24
In Isbell, the California Supreme Court in a four-to-three deci-
volve itself in further due process challenges to the confession of judgment proce-
dure. In Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191, 202 (1972), the Court said such a
determination is "peculiarly appropriate grist for the legislative mill." Congress
also has refused to take sides in this issue. Congress could have entirely elimi-
nated cognovit provisions (although admittedly only in the consumer context) as
part of the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1681 (1976), but refused to do so,
thus leaving the states to "choose up sides." Note, Swarb v. Lennox: 7he Viability
of Repeated Judicial Attacks on Confessions of Judgment in Pennsylvania, 34 U.
Prrr. L, REV. 103, 114 (1972).
21. CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE § 1132(a) (West Supp. 1978).
22. Id. §§ 1133-1134. California's statute closely resembles that of New York
-both statutes originated with the Field Code (New York's original codification of
law, as attributed to Mr. David Dudley Field) in 1848. N.Y. Civ. PRc. LA.v §§ 3201,
3218 (McKinney 1970). For a specific comparison of the statutes and interpreta-
tions, see Comment, Confession of Judgment in California, 8 PAc. L.J. 99, 103-13
(1977).
23. 59 Op. CAL. ArrT' GEN. 433 (1976). The restrictions that California places
on the use of cognovits appear in CAL. CIrv. CODE §§ 1689.12 (West Supp. 1978)
(home solicitation contracts or offers), 1804.1 (West 1973) (retail installment
sales), 2983.7 (West 1974) (automobile conditional sales contracts); CAL. FIN. CODE
§§ 18440 (industrial loans), 22053 (West Supp. 1978), 22467 (West 1968) (consumer
loans up to $10,000 and commercial loans up to $5,000).
24. The California legislature in 1975 added Act of Aug. 22, 1975, ch. 304, 1975
Cal. Stats. 752 (codified at CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 1132(b) (West Supp. 1978)), for
the protection of debtors contracting for family, household, or personal purposes.
The procedure now requires an attorney independently representing the con-
sumer to provide assistance and advice to the debtor before a creditor may obtain
a valid confession of judgment. The attorney's affidavit that he has advised the cli-
ent of the effect of the cognovit clause must accompany the consumer's statement
when filed for entry. The addition of the consumer safeguard appears to have re-
sulted from a compromise between consumer interest groups that opposed the
cognovit procedure altogether and the collection lobbyists that opposed any
change in the procedure. Nevertheless, the addition of the safeguard may virtually
eliminate the practical use of confessions of judgment in consumer transactions.
However, the legislative intent is still unclear. Comment, supra note 22, at 117.
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sion found that the provisions of California's confession of judg-
ment statute which relate to non-consumer transactions violate
fourteenth amendment due process requirements. 2 5 The Isbell
plaintiffs had obtained excessive welfare payments and at the
county's request had executed confessions of judgment.2 6 Their
suit for declaratory relief challenged the constitutionality of the
statutory confession of judgment procedure. Although plaintiffs
had signed the confessions without the benefit of legal counsel,
the trial court declared that the creditors had complied with the
statutory procedure in obtaining the confessions and that the pro-
cedure did not violate due process.2 7
Justice Tobriner, writing for the majority, leveled an attack at
several specific constitutional deficiencies in California's confes-
sion of judgment procedure. First, the debtor's signature alone
might not always indicate a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary
waiver of due process rights,28 yet the statute requires the court
clerk to enter judgment upon the creditor's presentation of the
debtor's signed statement. The majority held that California's
procedure lacks the means to determine on a case-by-case basis
whether the debtor knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
waived his rights to notice and hearing.29
Second, the confession of judgment procedure permits final en-
try of judgment without prior notice and opportunity for hear-
25. The court made it clear that the recently added CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE
§ 1132(b) (West Supp. 1978), discussed in note 24 supra, was excluded from their
condemnation of the California procedure. 21 Cal. 3d at 68, 74 n.7, 577 P.2d at 191,
198 n.7, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 371, 376 n.7. The following textual discussion is therefore
aimed at non-consumer transactions upon which § 1132(b) has no effect. See note
64 infra.
26. Plaintiff Isbell pleaded guilty to welfare fraud and was sentenced to 30
days in jail. She was induced to sign a confession of judgment after the court
failed to order restitution of $600 in overpayments. The county accused plaintiffs
Pearsons of misusing trust funds so as to constitute overpayments of $193. Both
plaintiffs executed confession forms furnished by the county. Each form provided:
I hereby confess judgment in favor of the County of Sonoma, the plaintiff
above named, for the sum of $-, and authorize entry of judgment against
me. This judgment applies to any personal and real property I now own
or may acquire.
This confession of judgment is for a debt justly due from me to the said
County of Sonoma, and arises upon the following facts; to wit -.
21 Cal. 3d at 65 n.2, 577 P.2d 190 n.2, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 370 n.2.
27. Id. at 66, 577 P.2d at 190, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 370.
28. Id. at 68-70, 577 P.2d at 192-93, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 372-73. See notes 7-11 and
accompanying text supra.
29. 21 Cal. 3d at 71, 577 P.2d at 194, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 374.
ing.30 The court stated, "unless the validity of the waiver is
determined 'before judgment is entered, an alleged debtor will be
deprived of his due process rights on every occasion when an ef-
fective waiver has not occurred.' "31
Third, the statute fails even to require notice to the debtor after
entry of judgment, thereby precluding a timely motion to vacate
the judgment.32 The court held that even if a debtor were to re-
ceive notice, any opportunity for post-entry relief fails to satisfy
due process standards because "post-judgment determination of
the validity of the waiver is not a determination 'at a meaningful
time.' "33
Finally, California's statute fails to provide an effective means
by which a debtor with a valid defense can vacate the entry of
judgment against .him.34 Assuming the debtor learns of the judg-
ment within the six-month period of the statute of limitations, he
can vacate the judgment only within the court's discretion and
then only on procedural grounds. 35
The majority's opinion in Isbell distinguished the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Overmyer on two grounds. First, the
Ohio procedure provides a debtor with safeguards unavailable
under the California statute.36 In contrast to the California proce-
dure, the Ohio statute requires immediate notice upon entry of
judgment and allows the debtor to vacate the judgment upon
showing a meritorious defense.37 Second, the constitutional chal-
lenge in Overmyer was broader in scope than that in Isbell. The
plaintiffs in Overmyer broadly asserted that a debtor could never
waive all rights to notice and hearing through a confession of
judgment procedure,38 while the plaintiffs in Isbell challenged
only the constitutionality of California's particular confession of
judgment procedure. Therefore, the Overmyer opinion did not re-
solve the specific issue presented in Isbell-whether a constitu-
tionally adequate procedure existed to ensure a valid waiver of
due process rights.39
30. Id. at 72, 577 P.2d at 194, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 374.
31. Id. (citing the Osmond remand opinion, 359 F. Supp. 124 (D. Del. 1972)
(See note 17 supra)). See text accompanying note 3 supra.
32. 21 Cal. 3d at 72-73, 577 P.2d at 194, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 374.
33. Id. at 72, 577 P.2d at 194, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 374 (quoting Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972)). See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Boddie v. Con-
necticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1964).
34. 21 Cal. 3d at 72, 577 P.2d at 194, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 374.
35. Id. See CAT. CIV. PROC. CODE § 473 (West Supp. 1978); 5 B. WrrxiN, CALi-
FORNIA PROCEDURE Attack on Judgment in Trial Court §§ 165, 175 (2d ed. 1971).
36. 21 Cal. 3d at 73, 577 P.2d at 194, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 374.
37. See text accompanying notes 15-16 supra.
38. 405 U.S. at 184.
39. 21 Cal. 3d at 73-74, 577 P.2d at 195, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 375. In a well-reasoned
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The majority in Isbell concluded that Overmyer does not conflict
with its ruling that California's confession of judgment procedure
is constitutionally inadequate.40 However, the majority's reconcil-
iation of its opinion in Isbell with that of the United States
Supreme Court in Overmyer ignores the crucial distinction be-
tween the two cases. The Overmyer Court ruled that availability
of post-judgment attack on a judgment entered upon confession
satisfies due process requirements. 4 1 By requiring pre-judgment
notice and opportunity for hearing,42 the Isbell holding fundamen-
tally conflicts with the Overmyer opinion.
The Isbell opinion could conceivably stand on grounds in-
dependent of fourteenth amendment due process. On several oc-
casions, 4 3 the California Supreme Court has invalidated summary
prejudgment remedies based on interpretations of the due pro-
cess clauses in California's constitution. 44 However, it is unclear
whether the Isbell court intended to apply California due process
law in addition to fourteenth amendment due process standards
in its analysis of California's cognovit provisions.4 5 Moreover, the
United States Supreme Court has failed to define clearly federal
dissenting opinion, Justice Richardson criticized the majority's "meat-axe" ap-
proach. Id. at 76, 577 P.2d at 197, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 377. Focusing on the facts of the
case, he argued that "there is not a scintilla of evidence that the plaintiffs did not
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive their due process rights." Id. at 77,
577 P.2d at 197, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 377. His dissent stressed that the case did not in-
volve the typical adhesive cognovit note authorizing in advance of default the en-
try of judgment Without notice and hearing. Id. at 76, 577 P.2d 197, 145 Cal. Rptr. at
377. In voting to follow Overmyer, Justice Richardson pointed out that sufficient
post-judgment relief was in fact available to the plaintiffs. Id. at 78-80, 577 P.2d at
198-99, 145 Cal Rptr. at 378-79.
40. Id. at 74, 577 P.2d at 195, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 375.
41. 405 U.S. at 188.
42. 21 Cal. 3d at 68, 71, 72, 577 P.2d at 192, 193, 194, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 372, 373, 374.
43. See Adams v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 11 Cal. 3d 146, 520 P.2d 961,
113 Cal. Rptr. 145 (1974) (sale of auto pursuant to garageman's lien); Rios v. Coz-
ens, 9 Cal. 3d 454, 509 P.2d 696, 107 Cal. Rptr. 784 (1973) (suspension of driver's li-
cense); Randone v. Appellate Dep't, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709
(1971) (prejudgment attachment); Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96
Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971) (claim and delivery); McCallop v. Carberry, 1 Cal. 3d 903, 464
P.2d 122, 83 Cal. Rptr. 666 (1970) (wage garnishment).
44. Article I, § 15, cl. 6, of the California Constitution reads in part: "Persons
may not. . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."
Article I, § 7(a), reads: "A person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law ......
45. Although it cited both federal and California precedents, the isbell court
expressly stated that it intended to applyfederal due process standards in its con-
sideration of the California statute. 21 Cal. 3d at 64, 75, 577 P.2d at 189, 196, 145 Cal.
Rptr. at 369, 376.
due process standards for summary creditors' remedies. 46 There-
fore, the Court must again focus on a challenge to the summary
confession of judgment procedure to clarify the due process limi-
tations.
THE NEED FOR CONFESSIONS OF JUDGMENT IN CALIFORNIA
Despite the tendency of California practitioners to downplay
the use of the confession of judgment,47 the lending industry ap-
pears to take advantage of non-restrictive commercial cognovit
procedures 48 in many of its transactions.49 The following argu-
46. The United States Supreme Court's decision in Sniadach v. Family Fin.
Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969), indicated a shift from traditional views on the nature of
the property interest protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Subsequent due process analyses by the Court have failed to define
the boundaries of due process challenges to creditors' remedies, including limita-
tions on the confession of judgment procedure.
The United States Supreme Court, in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), af-
firmed Sniadach by requiring a pre-termination evidentiary hearing to provide a
welfare recipient with procedural due process protection. Distinguishing
Goldberg, the Court in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), required notice of
termination to a recipient of disability benefits but refused to allow an administra-
tive hearing.
In Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), claim and delivery statutes permitted a
secured seller of goods to repossess without notice and hearing and without judi-
cial order or sipervision. The Court ruled that the deprivation of a property inter-
est is so significant as to require due process protection. However, in Mitchell v.
W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974), the Court appeared to retract its holding in
Sniadach and returned to a more limited view of the nature of property interests
protected by the due process clause.
Soon thereafter the Court distinguished Mitchell in a case involving similar
facts. In North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975), the
Court invalidated a statute lacking a provision for early hearing but permitting
prejudgment garnishment of a corporation's sizeable bank account. The Court, in
Carey v. Sugar, 425 U.S. 73 (1976), vacated the ruling of a New York federal district
court that had declared the New York prejudgment attachment statute unconstitu-
tional. These decisions have created a confusing mix of due process law.
47. The information on the practical use of confessions of judgment in Califor-
nia is based on interviews with corporate lending officers and with practitioners
specializing in securities and corporate law and on letters from government infor-
mation officers (on file with the San Diego Law Review).
48. The use of cognovits is prohibited in commercial transactions only up to
$5,000. CAL FMN. CODE § 22053 (West Supp. 1978). See note 23 supra.
49. In 1976, California institutional and corporate lenders made almost 9,000
commercial loans, totalling nearly one billion dollars. Moreover, recoveries on de-
faulted loans totalled almost eight million dollars. [1976] ANN. REPORT CAL. CON-
SUMER FINANCE LAws 17 18 (1977). Commercial lenders might easily have utilized
cognovit provisions in these loan contracts without fear of restriction under Cali-
fornia law and thereby recovered judgment on the basis of a cognovit clause. This
conclusion assumes additional validity because lenders can obtain an immediate
lien on the commercial borrower's real property. CAL. CIrV. PROC. CODE § 674
(West Supp. 1978), provides in pertinent part
An abstract of the judgment... may be recorded ... and from such re-
cording the judgment ... becomes a lien on all the real property of thejudgment debtor, not exempt from execution, in such county, owned by
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ments justify the use of cognovit procedure by California's lend-
ing industry. The arguments are relevant, however, not only to
California practice but also to a discussion of any state's confes-
sion of judgment procedure.
The United States Supreme Court, in Overmyer, emphasized
the continued validity and usefulness of cognovit clauses in the
commercial world.50 Cognovits generally provide a speedy, effec-
tive remedy in the event of a debtor's default. From the perspec-
tive of economic efficiency, the confession of judgment procedure
facilitates debt collection and enforcement of creditors' rights.5 1
Because the cognovit allows prompt liens on the debtor's prop-
erty, the cost of credit arguably decreases while the availability of
credit increases.5 2 When a debtor would otherwise fail to obtain a
loan because he lacks any form of collateral, the cognovit provides
a method for borrowing needed capital.5 3 In states which have
abolished or which restrain other forms of security, such as pre-
judgment attachment or claim and delivery, the cognovit device
assumes additonal significance.5 4
Creditors stress that notice and hearing requirements are un-
necessary and inflate the cost of credit.55 Through an effective
waiver of due process rights, the confession of judgment avoids
unnecessary contested litigation. Notice and hearing require-
ments effectively destroy this advantage by requiring additional
pleadings and appearances,56 thereby further burdening court cal-
endars.5 7 A notice requirement also endangers the creditor's se-
him at the time, or which he may afterward and before the lien expires,
acquire.
See note 3 and accompanying text supra.
50. D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. at 187-88.
51. Auerbach, Cognovit Notes: Should They Be Abolished?, 80 COM. L.J. 97, 101(1975).
52. Id.
53. Note, Swarb v. Lennox: The Viability of Repeated Judicial Attacks on Con-
fessions of Judgment in Pennsylvania, 34 U. Prrr. L. REV. 103, 113 (1972).
54. Id. For example, Pennsylvania does not authorize the wage garnishment
procedure.
55. Griffith, The Creditor, the Debtor, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 28 MER-
CER L. REV. 663, 665 (1977) (noting Justice White's dissent in Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67 (1972)). When the creditor has no alternative means of recovering but
to file suit on the note, the argument that the cost of credit will rise is probably a
good one. Comment, Confessions of Judgment, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 524, 538 (1954).
56. Anderson, A Proposed Solution for the Commercial World to the Sniadach-
Fuentes Problem: Contractual Waiver, 78 CoM. L.J. 283, 284 (1973).
57. Id. at 284. See Hopson, Cognovit Judgments: An Ignored Problem of Due
Process and Full Faith and Credit, 29 U. CHm. L. REV. 111, 123 (1961). At least one
curity interest 8 when the property sold pursuant to judgment on
the note is depreciable, or when the debtor can avoid the service
of process, because notice nullifies the advantages of speed and
surprise. Furthermore, a debtor can easily abuse the hearing
process by requesting a hearing with the sole intention of delay-
ing repayment. Creditors also point out that debtors have no
need for prejudgment hearing when they can raise a legal or equi-
table defense and easily persuade a court to vacate or to open the
judgment.5 9
Despite the advantages of the confession of judgment proce-
dure, many creditors choose not to include a cognovit provision in
notes or contracts. Several fa:ctors influence their choice. Credi-
tors may wish to avoid negative reactions of borrowers, judges,
and the general public to a summary remedy that does not pro-
vide for notice.6 0 At least two economic factors also play an im-
portant role in a creditor's choice to refrain from using the
confession of judgment. First, creditors with high losses because
of defaults tend to use the cognovit more frequently.61 Second,
competition within the industry favors the debtor; he may choose
to borrow from a creditor who does not require a cognovit provi-
sion rather than from the creditor who insists upon it.62
BALANCING THE INTERESTS: ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF DUE
PROCESS SAFEGUARDS
Growing distaste for the confession of judgment is apparent in
writer has asked whether a court's function is to demand litigation in every dis-
pute or "to provide an impartial, neutral forum." Cognovit Revisited, supra note 3,
at 1066.
58. Anderson, A Proposed Solution for the Commercial World to the Sniadach-
Fuentes Problem: Contractual Waiver, 78 CoM. L.J. 283, 284 (1973). Creditors also
argue that with "sewer service" problems, there is no guarantee that the debtor
will even receive notice. The term "sewer service" means lack of actual service
accompanied by fraudulent return of service. See generally Note, Abuse of Proc-
ess: Sewer Service, 3 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 17 (1967). For proposed solutions,
see Comment, Sewer Service and Confessed Judgments: New Protection for Low-
Income Consumers, 6 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 414 (1971); Note, Civil Procedure-A
Possible Solution to the Problem of "Sewer Service" in Consumer Credit Actions,
51 N.C. L. REV. 1517 (1973).
59. Hopson, supra note 57, at 122, 131 n.126; Comment, Confessions of Judg-
men 102 U. PA. L. REv. 524, 531 (1954).
60. Hopson, supra note 57, at 120. States also may restrict the use of cognovits
to the point of impracticability or may prohibit their use altogether. Nearly every
state, except Pennsylvania and Illinois, places some form of restriction on the
creditor's ability to use the cognovit procedure. California's restrictions appear at
note 23 supra. Some states go so far as to make its use a criminal offense. E.g.,
IND. CODE ANN. § 2-2906 (Burns 1968); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 21-9-18 (1970).
61. Hopson, supra note 57, at 123.
62. Id.
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recent legislation and judicial rulings. 63 When viewed in conjunc-
tion with the competing interests of both debtor and creditor, this
growing distaste indicates the confession of judgment procedure
must include due process safeguards in order to balance the in-
terests of both parties.64
After implementation of the safeguards required by the Isbell
court, debtors will still be able to waive due process rights to no-
tice and hearing.65 In this sense, safeguards need not preclude
creditors' interests entirely. As the California Supreme Court
pointed out in Isbell, the debtor's waiver need only be shown to
be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.66 The cognovit's legitimate
advantages are retained if the creditor can show such a waiver.67
Despite the arguments of creditors and of the lending industry,
most commentators see little effect, if any, of Isbell's require-
ments on the availability and cost of credit.68
The crucial factor in this balancing of interests is that lenders
have failed to demonstrate a need for the continued use of the
63. Id. at 131. See Atlas Credit Corp. v. Ezrine, 25 N.Y.2d 219, 250 N.E.2d 474,
303 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1969). Ohio has recently amended its procedure to prohibit use
of cognovits in consumer transactions. See Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2323.13(E)
(Page Supp. 1978).
64. Arguments against the cognovit procedure in either consumer or non-con-
sumer contexts are similar, if not identical. Commercial and business transac-
tions, in which the inequities of the device are not likely to be as great, clearly fall
into the non-consumer category. However, all contracts which are not related to
personal, household, or family matters and which do not involve business or com-
mercial matters also fall into the non-consumer category. Therefore, unless a
third category is created (such as the "neither-commercial-nor-consumer" transac-
tion encountered in Isbell), the following arguments may safely be directed at the
non-consumer confession of judgment procedure in general.
65. See note 9 supra.
66. 21 Cal. 3d at 71, 577 P.2d at 193-94, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 373-74. See note 11 and
accompanying text supra.
67. Hopson, supra note 57, at 142.
68. See Krahmer, Clifford, & Lasley, Fuentes v. Shevin: Due Process and the
Consumer, A Legal and Empirical Study, 4 TEx. TECH L. REV. 23, 61-62 (1972).
However, the commentators are still in the throes of debate. At least one author
doubts "that present economic empirical studies are sufficiently precise to warrant
a positive statement that proscribing cognovit notes will or will not have the effect
of seriously and undesirably restricting needed access to credit." Auerbach, Cog-
novit Notes: Should They Be Abolished?, 80 CoM. L.J. 97, 101 (1975). See also
Randone v. Appellate Dep't, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 555, 488 P.2d 13, 26, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 722
(1971) (citing Comment, The Constitutional Validity of Attachment in Light of
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 17 U.C.L.A. L REV. 837, 846 (1970)); Smith, Pre-
serving Consumers' Claims and Defenses, 63 A.B.A. J. 1400, 1403 (1977); Whitford &
Laufer, The Impact of Denying Self-Help Repossession of Automobiles: A Case
Study of the Wisconsin Consumer Act, 1975 Wis. L. REV. 607, 630-38, 654-55.
cognovit. Although the traditional mortgage generally cannot sub-
stitute for the cognovit,69 other remedies are available.70 For ex-
ample, California specifically allows prejudgment attachment
against commercial and business entities upon default.71 Because
due process safeguards will have little effect on the cost and avail-
ability of credit, and because other remedies are available, credi-
tors have certainly failed to show an overriding need for
confession of judgment without notice.72 Although creditors must
expend more time and effort in the use of the confession of judg-
ment to guarantee a valid waiver, due process safeguards will not
make the procedure unduly burdensome.
Even if creditors could demonstrate substantial need for the
cognovit, constitutional due process considerations should over-
ride increased credit costs and any additional burdens on the ju-
dicial system.73 The United States Supreme Court has imposed
strict standards on the waiver of constitutional rights.74 A non-ju-
dicial officer is in no position to determine on the basis of a signa-
ture alone that a waiver of due process rights has been knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary.7 5
At least one critic argues that although bargaining power theo-
retically exists between commercial entities, in fact there proba-
bly is none.76 Therefore, the commercial waiver could very well
lack "voluntariness." The United States Supreme Court has
69. Because the mortgage involves many incidental expenses and operates on
realty, it is unsuited for many loans for which the cognovit finds use. Comment,
Confessions of Judgment, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 524, 536 (1954).
70. California's "offer to compromise" statute, CAI. Cirv. PRoc. CODE § 998
(West Supp. 1978), provides the debtor who chooses not to assert a meritorious
defense the opportunity to save time and expense by confessing to the entry of
judgment against him in an action already filed by the creditor. See Comment,
supra note 22, at 109.
71. See CAt. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 484-488 (West Supp. 1978). For a discussion of
reasons why prejudgment attachment ought to be readily available to creditors of
commercial and business entities, see Comment, California's New Attachment
Law: Problems in Interpretation, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 792, 794-99 (1976). California's
claim and delivery statute, CAL. CV. PROC. CODE §§ 512.010-.120 (West Supp. 1978),
requires a hearing prior to issuance of a writ except when "the defendant acquired
possession of the property in the ordinary course of his trade or business or for
commercial purposes." Id. § 512.020(b)(3).
72. "As one extensive user who strongly defended the [confession of judg-
ment] practice said. 'Finance companies and consumer lenders can fit this credit
policy to either policy the state chooses."' Hopson, supra note 57, at 125.
73. Id. at 123. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 540-41 (1971).
74. See Note, Confessions of Judgment: The Due Process Defects, 43 TEMp. L.Q.
279, 286 n.53 (1970); note 11 and accompanying text supra.
75. See Virgin I. Nat'l Bank v. Tropical Ventures, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 1203, 1207
(D. St. Croix 1973); Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091, 1101 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
76. Hopson, supra note 57, at 138 n.166. It would not be unreasonable to state
that all contracts between institutional lenders and borrowers, including commer-
cial entities, are to be at least initially classified as adhesion contracts. Id. at 124.
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stated that when consent is based on a contract lacking voluntari-
ness, the agreement is little more than enforced acceptance.77
Legislators may argue that a large, conspicuous warning allevi-
ates the problem of effective waiver.78 No matter how conspicu-
ous the warning, it is always possible that the debtor fails to
understand its effect.79 Although the debtor may think he under-
stands, he may logically assume, regardless of the language of the
warning, that his present signature will not waivefuture defenses.
The debtor usually fails to realize that he can ask the creditor to
strike the clause. Even if he does, the creditor may assume a
take-it-or-leave-it stance.80
Requirements of notice and opportunity for hearing will not fur-
ther burden the court calendar unless the debtor has a meritori-
ous defense or the waiver lacks any of the requisite elements.81
In the commercial context, many debtors probably will not con-
test the entry of judgment.82 Notice and hearing requirements
will ensure at least that the debtor has made a cognizant choice
not to contest.83
Substantial Isbell problems probably will not arise in the com-
mercial context.84 However, it cannot be assumed that a waiver is
voluntary and effective simply because the debtor is a non-con-
sumer.85 Due process safeguards can be drafted that will still al-
77. Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928) (non-resident motorist statute fail-
ing to require notice to defendant motorist). See also Cognovit Revisited, supra
note 3, at 1049 n.27, which discusses Szukhent's failure to deal with the issue of
waiver of notice when the contract involves parties of unequal bargaining power.
See note 9 supra.
78. See, e.g., OMo REV. CODE ANN. § 2323.13(D) (Page Supp. 1978).
79. Shinker, Confessions of Judgment: An Analysis of the Present Situation, 55
CHL B. REC. 238, 244 (1974).
80. Id.
81. The opportunity for notice might also prevent courts from having uni-
formly to reopen judgments to hear defenses that might have been heard prior to
entry of judgment. Hopson, supra note 57, at 142 n.192.
82. Virgin 1. Nat'l Bank v. Tropical Ventures, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 1203, 1207 (D.
St. Croix 1973).
83. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1940).
84. The waiver may indeed assume validity in the context of commercial and
business transactions. See Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614, 621 (S.D. Cal. 1972)
(dictum); Anderson, A Proposed Solution for the Commercial World to the Snia-
dach-Fuentes Problem: Contractual Waiver, 78 COM. L.J. 283, 285 (1973); Comment,
supra note 22, at 118. This fact should lessen only the creditor's burden of show-
ing that the debtor actually made an effective waiver. See Isbell v. County of So-
noma, 21 Cal. 3d at 75, 577 P.2d at 196, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 376. See also note 120 infra.
85. "[T]his is a question of fact which I would hestitate to dispose of through
low the confession of judgment procedure to provide its
legitimate advantages. Other states have included these protec-
tions in their confession of judgment legislation.
DuE PROCESS GUIDELNES FROM OTHER STATES
Examination and comparison of the confession of judgment
statutes of other states provide guidelines for procedural safe-
guards.8 6 California's legislature may utilize these guidelines in
drafting a confession of judgment statute meeting the concerns of
the Isbell court. The procedural or substantive safeguards de-
scribed below constitute meritorious provisions which the Califor-
nia legislature should consider when restructuring California's
confession of judgment statute.
New York prohibits pre-default confessions of judgment in re-
tail installment sales of $1500 or less.8 7 Creditors must file the
debtor's confession of judgment in the county where the defend-
ant resided or where entry of judgment was authorized when the
confession was executed.8 8 The creditor may fie the confession
of judgment as an immediate lien on the debtor's property as se-
curity for sums to become due. However, New York expressly re-
stricts execution on the lien only to sums which are then due.8 9
Judicial interpretation of the New York statute allows some judg-
ments to be opened upon a debtor's motion.90
fllinois also places venue restrictions on the filing of a debtor's
confession.91 To contest the judgment the debtor need show only
a prima facie defense to all or part of the creditor's demand,
rules of thumb." Virgin I. Nat'l Bank v. Tropical Ventures, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 1203,
1207 (D. St. Croix 1973).
86. Several states have been selected with an eye toward historical leadership,
similarity in business trends, and degree of use of cognovits in a commercial con-
text. Statutes recently amended in light of judicial decisions similar to that in
Isbell have also been examined.
87. N.Y. CIv. PR~c. LAw § 3201 (McKinney 1970). Although the New York stat-
ute expressly excludes commercial or business debts, New York legislators appar-
ently assumed, as did California legislators, that commercial and business debtors
do not need due process protections. See N.Y. Crv. PRAC. LAW § 3218 commentary
C3218:12 (McKinney 1970): "If CPLR 3218 [N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 3218] and its re-
quirements are met.. . its confession procedure, for the time being at least, may
be said to be safe." (emphasis added).
88. N.Y. Cirv. PRAc. LAw § 3218(a) (1) (McKinney 1970).
89. Id. § 3218(c).
90. E.g., when entry was made contra to the terms of the confession affidavit.
A third-party creditor also may seek to vacate upon motion. See id. § 3218 com-
mentary C3218:12.
91. The creditor may file the confession in the county where the confession
was executed, where the debtor resides, or where the debtor owns property. Civil
Practice Act, Ia. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 50(3) (Smith-Hurd 1968).
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whereupon the issue is set for hearing.92 If the debtor's affidavit
states only a counterclaim, the court may stay proceedings on the
creditor's action pending disposition of the counterclaim.93
Ohio has always required that notice immediately follow entry
of judgment.94 Ohio authorizes the use of cognovits only when
the document contains a specific, clear, and conspicuous warn-
ing.95 A debtor can open the judgment by showing that he never
received notice and that he now has a valid defense.96
Pennsylvania, in response to criticism of its procedure from the
United States Supreme Court,97 recently added a protective provi-
sion. Pennsylvania's procedure now provides that when the de-
fendant produces questions of fact appropriate for a jury, the
court shall open the judgment.98
Delaware requires notice and opportunity for a judicial determi-
nation on the validity of the debtor's waiver prior to entry of judg-
ment.99 Even though the debtor signs a confession of judgment,
92. ILT. Sup. CT. R. 276.
93. Id. See generally Pyes, Reappraisal of the Confession of Judgment Law,
48 IL. B.J. 764, 771 (1960). The author recommends several changes in the Illinois
confession of judgment procedure: (1) prohibit pre-default confessions, (2) require
an affidavit that the debtor's action constitutes a threat to the creditor's security,
supported by criminal penalties in cases of false affidavits, and (3) compensation
for the debtor, including costs and fees, for abuse by the creditor of the confession
of judgment procedure.
An Illinois appellate court has refused to invalidate the Illinois confession of
judgment procedure even though it fails to provide for pre-entry notice and oppor-
tunity for hearing. Irmco Hotels Corp. v. Solomon, 27 IMl. App. 3d 225, 326 N.E.2d
542 (1975). The record was supported by the trial court's finding that the debtor,
who was here a consumer, had knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived
process. Accord, Justice Richardson's dissent in Isbell, 21 Cal. 3d at 77, 577 P.2d at
198, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
94. Omo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2323.12-.13 (Page Supp. 1978). That the Ohio pro-
cedure requires notice makes it more equitable than California's cognovit statute,
which fails to require notice at any time.
95. Id. § 2323.13(D). Significantly, Ohio now prohibits the use of cognovits in
consumer transactions altogether, expressly instructing that civil actions only are
proper in the consumer context. Id. § 2323.13(E).
96. Omo R. Civ. P. § 60(B)(5).
97. Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191, 195-96, 201-02 (1972); D.H. Overmyer Co. v.
Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 190 (1972).
98. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2959(e) (Purdon 1975). Cf. CAL Cxv. PRoc. CODE
§ 473 (West. Supp. 1978) (the court has discretion to vacate or to set aside the
judgment).
Maryland resembles Pennsylvania in its standard for opening judgment. M.D. R.
Civ. P. § 645(d).
99. DEL CODE tit. 10, § 2306(b) (1975). Delaware amended its procedure after
the decision of the Delaware federal district court in Osmond v. Spence, 327 F.
Supp. 1349 (D. DeL 1971). See note 17 supra.
he cannot waive defenses then unknown to him or defenses that
may arise in the future. 00
PROPOSED SAFEGUARDS FOR CALIFORNIA
Some states have applied due process safeguards to consumer
debtors only.'0 ' Other states have required safeguards in the use
of confessions of judgment in consumer and non-consumer trans-
actions alike.102 The holding of the California Supreme Court in
Isbell would require due process protections in all cognovit pro-
cedures in California.
Several important questions must be answered before drafting
a cognovit procedure with due process safeguards. Should the
legislative intent behind California's consumer protection legisla-
tion, 03 along with its procedural restrictions, carry over into the
non-consumer area? Should a new statute require opportunity for
a pre-entry waiver hearing' 04 and a method by which a debtor
can more easily challenge the entry of judgment against him, or
will the former safeguard alone satisfy the California Supreme
Court? 0 5 How many and which procedural safeguards evident in
other states' statutes should California's legislature include in a
new confession of judgment procedure? These questions are but
a few of many that California legislators must consider in drafting
a constitutionally permissible statute.
RECOMMENDED LEGISLATION
Notice and Opportunity for Hearing
California should require that notice be given a debtor when his
confession of judgment is filed. The notice should explainl 06 the
debtor's opportunity, prior to entry of judgment,107 for a hearing
100. DEL CODE tit. 10, § 2306(j) (1975).
101. See, e.g., New York, note 87 supra; Ohio, note 95 supra.
102. See, e.g., Delaware, notes 99-100 supra.
103. CAi. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1132(b) (West Supp. 1978). See note 24 supra.
104. See Isbell v. County of Sonoma, 21 Cal. 3d at 71, 577 P.2d at 194, 145 Cal.
Rptr. at 374.
105. Id. at 71-72, 577 P.2d at 194-95, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 374-75.
106. A clear explanation in layman's terms is only appropriate when due pro-
cess safeguards are at issue. Any less informative method of notice of opportunity
for a hearing would entirely defeat the intention of the safeguard, i.e., to apprise
every confessed debtor of his rights to due process, especially those who failed to
comprehend the effect of their waivers in the first place. See Sniadach v. Family
Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 339-40 (1969); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust
Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1940).
107. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
U.S. 67, 80-82 (1972); Isbell v. County of Sonoma, 21 Cal. 3d at 68, 577 P.2d at 192, 145
Cal. Rptr. at 372; and discussion of notice requirements at text accompanying
notes 30 & 39-42 supra.
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to determine judicially08 the effectiveness of his waiver. Notice
will not result in an overburdened court calendar if there has
been an effective waiver. 09
No Pre-Default Confessions of Judgment
California should prohibit confessions of judgment executed
prior to the debtor's default.110 This safeguard, by preventing a
debtor's waiver of unknown or future defenses,"'l would alleviate
the particular concern of reviewing courts and legislatures. 1 2
Prohibiting pre-default confessions may curtail the availability
of credit when a debtor has no other means of giving collateral."13
However, such use in the non-consumer area is extremely rare
and would not affect the creditor's ability ultimately to recover.
Arguably, debtors would not need both notice and hearing protec-
tion and pre-default protection." 4 However, notice and hearing
108. Determination by a judicial officer is required. A court clerk has no au-
thority to find that a question of fact has been raised. Isbell v. County of Sonoma,
21 Cal. 3d at 71, 577 P.2d at 194, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 374.
109. See Virgin L Nat'l Bank v. Tropical Ventures, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 1203, 1207
(D. St. Croix 1973); text accompanying notes 81-82 supra. In most circumstances,
especially in the commercial context, debtors will be hard-pressed to argue rea-
sonably that their waivers were not knowing and intelligent. See note 84 and ac-
companying text supra. However, effective waiver also requires the element of
voluntariness. In cases involving commercial transactions, the assumption should
not be made that the waivers are always effective. 'To do so could create an un-
welcome precedent for more marginal cases." Virgin I. Nat'l Bank v. Tropical Ven-
tures, Inc., 358 F. Supp. at 1207. See Hopson, supra note 57, at 124, 138 n.166; text
accompanying note 76 supra.
110. Arguably, California's "offer to compromise" provision, CAL. CIV. PRoc.
CODE § 998 (West Supp. 1978), described in note 70 supra, should control the type
of situation in which a debtor can confess to judgment only after a default has oc-
curred. See Comment, supra note 22, at 109. However, the "offer to compromise"
statute would not apply to confessions executed after default but before a claim
has been filed.
Massachusetts and Florida represent several states permitting confessions of
judgment only after suit has been fied. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 55.05 (West 1969); MAss.
ANN. LAWs ch. 231, § 13-A (Michie/Law Co-op. 1957).
111. See, e.g., DEL. CODE tit. 10, § 2306(j) (1975). California's statute should con-
tain language to this effect.
112. The obvious example of this particular concern is that of the California
Supreme Court in Isbell, including Justice Richardson in dissent. 21 Cal. 3d at 69-
70, 76, 577 P.2d at 193, 197, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 373, 377. See also Atlas Credit Corp. v.
Ezrine, 25 N.Y.2d 219, 232, 250 N.E.2d 474, 482, 303 N.Y.S.2d 382, 393 (1969), and the
position taken by states restricting the use of cognovits until after default, note 110
supra.
113. See text accompanying note 53 supra.
114. See 21 Cal. 3d at 76-77, 577 P.2d at 197-98, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 377-78, where
Justice Richardson in dissent argues that an actual, existing controversy should
are still necessary because post-default waiver is not always
knowing and intelligent or may be the product of an adhesive con-
tract.
Procedure to Reopen Judgment
California should relieve a confessed debtor of the unwarranted
burden he is forced to bear in seeking to reopen judgment.115 A
debtor should be able to reopen judgment by showing that he
never received notice and that he now has a meritorious de-
fense.116 A third-party creditor who seeks to reopen judgment on
the basis of a cognovit executed to defraud creditors could also
benefit from this provision."17
Under the retroactive application given the Isbell holding,118
debtors who believe they have a valid defense to the underlying
obligation may now seek to reopen judgment. However, the cur-
rent method of attacking final judgment in Californial19 discour-
ages pre-Isbell debtors from raising a valid defense.
Retroactive Application
California should require, on any writ of execution sought on a
confessed judgment entered prior to the Isbell decision, that the
clerk of the court provide notice to the debtor of the opportunity
for a hearing on the issues of indebtedness and of effective waiver
of due process rights.120 This limited retroactive application
would ensure that debtors whose confessions of judgment had
been ified but upon which execution had not yet issued would
benefit from the Isbell decision.121
not be subject to the same due process considerations contemplated by the major-
ity in Isbell. Logically, Justice Richardson might also argue that upon the debtor's
default, due process safeguards may take a form other than those required by the
majority in Isbell.
115. See note 3 supra.
116. See notes 96-98 and accompanying text supra. Although California has not
experienced the "sewer service" problems of New York, see note 58 supra, it must
still deal with the lack of actual notice.
117. See N.J. REv. STAT. § 27-254 (1937).
118. 21 Cal. 3d at 74-75, 577 P.2d at 196, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 376.
119. See text accompanying notes 34-37 supra.
120. See DEL CODE tit. 10, § 2306(f) (1975). At this hearing, the creditor would
have to overcome the presumption against the waiver of constitutional
rights-that is, the burden of proof on the validity of the waiver is on the creditor.
21 Cal. 3d at 75, 577 P.2d at 196, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 376. See Case Note, Commercial
Law-Confession of Judgment-Hearing Required on Voluntariness of Waiver
Before Entry of Judgment-Virgin Islands National Bank v. Tropical Ventures,
Inc., 15 B.C. INDus. & COM. L. RE V. 624, 631 (1974). Contra, Virgin I. Nat'l Bank v.
Tropical Ventures, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 1203, 1207 (D. St. Croix 1973).
121. Such debtors would not otherwise receive the protection afforded by the
prejudgment determinations of the validity of the waiver. They would be unable
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Protections Against Abuse
The legislature should specifically provide that costs and attor-
neys' fees be awarded to the prevailing party.2 2 If costs and fees
are awarded, the confessed debtor will be discouraged from em-
ploying dilatory or obstructive tactics. Criminal sanctions or an
award for damages for abuse of the opportunity-for-hearing re-
quirement may be an even greater deterrent.123
CONCLUSION
Isbell v. County of Sonoma appears as the latest in a series of
due process cases reexamining the role of debtors' rights in a fast-
paced, commercialized world. In light of growing distaste for the
confession of judgment device in the eyes of many courts and
state legislatures, the Isbell result was inevitable. The scale,
which has usually tipped in favor of creditors' summary remedies,
is swinging back toward a balance because the lending industry
cannot demonstrate an overriding need for the cognovit proce-
dure.
Courts should not accept the proposition that due process
rights can be waived by a signature alone while simultaneously
recognizing the presumption against waiver of constitutional
rights.124 These positions are logically inconsistent.
The opinion of the California Supreme Court in Isbell12S is also
inconsistent with the position taken by the United States
Supreme Court.126 However, because independent state grounds
may provide sufficient support for the California Supreme Court's
position,12 7 this apparent conflict may prove no more than aca-
to assert a meritorious defense without first overcoming the burden of seeking to
reopen the final entry of judgment. See note 3 supra.
122. CAl. CIV. CODE § 1717 (West 1973) requires the award of attorneys' fees to
the prevailing party only when a contract specifically provides for attorneys' fees
to one of the parties. The statute does not address itself to the contract that lacks
provision for attorneys' fees.
123. In regard to such protection against abuse by the creditor, see Pyes, Reap-
praisal of the Confession of Judgment Law, 48 ILL B.J. 764, 771 (1960).
124. See notes 9-11 and accompanying text supra.
125. See text accompanying notes 40-42 supra.
126. The effect of the language in Overmyer, that post-judgment opportunity for
a determination of the validity of the defendant's waiver satisfies due process, is to
allow deprivation of a significant property interest, however temporary, on the ba-
sis of the debtor's signature alone. See notes 7-11 and accompanying text supra.
127. See text accompanying notes 18 & 41 supra. The California Supreme Court
has in the past used the "independent state grounds" theory to protect an inter-
demic. Therefore, it is now incumbent upon the California legisla-
ture to delineate safeguards that will allow the confession of
judgment procedure to remain functional.
The safeguards proposed in this Comment may appear ex-
treme. However, each is designed to prevent the iniquitous situa-
tions that have promulgated due process challenges to summary
creditors' remedies. As restructured, the confession of judgment
procedure can still be advantageous to creditors while satisfying
the requirements of the California Supreme Court in Isbell.
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pretation of due process requirements that differed from the view taken by the
United States Supreme Court. Rios v. Cozens, 7 Cal. 3d 792, 499 P.2d 979, 103 Cal.
Rptr. 299 (1972) (invalidation of procedure allowing summary suspension of
driver's license without opportunity for hearing), vacated sub nom. Department of
Motor Vehicles v. Rios, 410 U.S. 425 (1973) (vacating and remanding because un-
able to determine whether California Supreme Court's holding based on four-
teenth amendment grounds or on art. I, § 13, of California's Constitution); Rios v.
Cozens, 9 Cal. 3d 454, 509 P.2d 696, 107 Cal. Rptr. 784 (1973) (California Constitution
provides independent grounds upon which original disposition stands). Contra,
Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719-20 (1975).
"Independent state grounds" terminology refers also to interpretation by a state
of provisions in its own statutes or constitution identical to provisions in the
United States Constitution. For an excellent discussion of the "new federalism"
and the "identical provisions" dilemma, see Note, The New Federalism: Toward a
Principled Interpretation of the State Constitution, 29 STAN. L. REV. 297 (1977).
